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During the 1976-1977 term the Louisiana Supreme Court disposed of
more disciplinary cases than in any prior comparable period. There were
four disbarments,' one disbarment on consent, 2 two suspensions 3 and two
suspensions on consent.4 In addition six attorneys 5 were suspended from
practice on interim suspension orders pending completion of disciplinary
proceedings.6 During the term the court concluded nine proceedings,
entered six interim suspension orders, and at the conclusion of the term
had fourteen disciplinary proceedings pending.7
The four disbarments arose out of the same incident. The four
attorneys, and others,8 were indicted by the grand jury for the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Three were
charged with mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1341, respectively. The fourth was charged with
conspiracy to commit mail fraud. After a trial lasting almost two months,
all defendants were found guilty, and each was sentenced to three years
imprisonment. 9 The sentence was later changed to three years active
* Visiting Professor of Law, Louisiana State University (Summer, 1977);
Member, Committee on Professional Responsibility, Louisiana State Bar Associa-
tion; Member, Louisiana State and Shreveport Bar Associations.
1. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Hamilton, 343 So. 2d 985 (La. 1977); Louisia-
na State Bar Ass'n. v. Hennigan, 340 So. 2d 264 (La. 1976); Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n. v. Shaheen, 338 So. 2d 1347 (La. 1976); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v.
Loridans, 338 So. 2d 1338 (La. 1976).
2. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Wallace, No. 56,973 (La. 1977).
3. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. McSween, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977);
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Ponder, 340 So. 2d 134 (La. 1976).
4. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Ehmig, No. 55,877 (La. 1977); Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n. v. Horton, 347 So. 2d 1107 (La. 1977).
5. Theodore J. Adams, Jr., docket number 59,057; Earl J. Schmitt, Jr., docket
number 59,001; Charles M. Stevenson, docket number 58,661; James F. Quaid, Jr.,
docket number 58,520; Dudley A. Phillips, Jr., docket number 58,505; 0. Romaine
Russell, docket number 58,273.
6. These suspensions were pursuant to ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION,
LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N., LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, art. XV, § 8, 1-6 [hereinafter
cited as ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION].
7. See listing in Pate, Report by Committee on Professional Responsibility, 25
LA. B.J. 8, 9 (1977).
8. These included a fifth attorney, Irwin L. Tunis, who has since been disbar-
red. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Tunis, 352 So. 2d 623 (La. 1977).
9. Shaheen and Loridans were convicted of both the substantive and conspir-
1978]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
probation with special conditions attached. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment.' 0
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari and the judgment became
final, the Louisiana State Bar Association, through the Committee on
Professional Responsibility, instituted disciplinary proceedings." The
court appointed commissioners in the cases and hearings were held. After
briefing and argument, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that
disbarment was the appropriate remedy in each instance.
The convictions, as noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court and by the
Fifth Circuit, grew out of a scheme to defraud insurance companies by
staging accidents. The plan involved doctors, lawyers and others. Chief
Judge John Brown, in an opinion cited in each of the disbarment proceed-
ings, called the situation a second "American tragedy." He detailed the
specifics of what he referred to as "the Louisiana-wide get-rich-quick
scheme . . . [the] staging of fraudulent automobile accidents for the
purpose of creating false personal injury claims."' 2
acy counts. Hennigan was convicted only of conspiracy. Hamilton was found guilty
of conspiracy.
10. United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
945 (1974).
11. The filing was made pursuant to ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note
6, § 8, 7(a)-(d).
12. The observations of Judge Brown, quoted extensively by the supreme
court, included:
The facts of this case, in a purely legalistic sense, need no embellishment in
a literary sense to classify this as a piece of prose that could well be called a
second "American tragedy". It would be an "American tragedy," not only
because the events took place here, but because it is just another instance in
which large numbers of Americans get willingly involved in enterprises which
reflect a lack of compunction, possibly even a proclivity, to enter into the
proverbial "get-rich-quick scheme" evidencing not only a disregard for law
but, sadly, also a deafness to conscience. As we undertake our profound but
prosaic role of adjudicating these cases, what we see is not pleasant. It reveals
a wreckage of promising professional careers, evidence of deliberate and una-
bashed attempts to prey upon financially pressed expectant mothers for gain
and the seemingly all too eager participation by a large cast of characters in a
patently illegal undertaking.
The Scheme
A recital of the facts must precede resolution of the issues raised on
appeal. The Louisiana-wide get-rich-quick scheme involved the staging of
fraudulent automobile accidents for the purpose of creating false personal
injury claims. These claims would be submitted to the insurance carriers for the
respective vehicles involved in the wrecks with the aid and contrivance of
certain physicians and lawyers.
As the scheme evolved, the participants even coined their own terminolo-
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The cases present, sadly, as Judge Brown noted, "a wreckage of
promising professional careers." They highlight the onerous but vital duty
of the organized bar to police its own for the protection of the courts, the
public and the profession.
Procedurally the cases are important since they establish that the date
of the finality of the conviction of a felony determines the applicability of
article XV of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar
Association. 13
Of equal, and perhaps surpassing, importance are the holdings that
petitions for disciplinary action based on felony convictions are to be
gy which, though alien to the uninitiated, became known to all those who
participated. This glossary of modern day crookedness was quite descriptive.
Certain participants were known as "recruiters". The recruiters['] function,
not unnaturally, was to recruit others who assumed titles commensurate with
their organizational function. There were the "hitters", whose function it was
to drive the "hitter" vehicle in each collision which supposedly was to be liable
for causing the accident. Then there was [sic] the "target" vehicles. The
occupants of the "target" were known as the "driver" and the "riders". It was
determined at the outset that pregnant women made exceptionally good riders
as they could claim pregnancy related injuries which would be both hard to
disprove and easily settleable with the insurance carriers. Throughout the
scheme there was an effort made on the part of the participants to use vehicles
and drivers which were covered by high limits of liability insurance.
According to a pre-arranged timetable, the "hitter" vehicle would strike
the "target" vehicle either broadside or in the rear end. The occupants of the
"target" vehicle-the driver and riders-and occasionally some of those in the
"hitter" vehicle, feigning injuries, would be sent to a particular doctor and
lawyer who would facilitate phony claims by creating a medical history for
treatment of non-existent injuries and making a demand on the appropriate
insurance company.
The key to immediate financial gain in each staged collision was advances
paid by the attorneys to the "riders" for whom allegedly false claims were
being submitted. These advances were paid in the form either of cash payments
or loans from local financial institutions, co-signed by the attorney handling the
claim. Of the usual advance ranging from $250 to $500, part was retained by the
rider-claimant with the rest being distributed among the organizers, recruiters,
and others who assisted with various aspects of staging the wreck. When the
claim was ultimately settled with the insurance carrier, the proceeds would be
applied to (i) repay the advancing attorney or in such cases, to liquidate the
guaranteed bank loan and (ii) to pay the inflated doctor's bill, not infrequently,
with kickbacks going to both the organizers and the participating attorneys in
addition to their usual shares.
489 F.2d at 54-55 (footnotes omitted). See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Shaheen,
338 So. 2d 1347, 1349-50 (La. 1976).
13. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 6, § 8. Though this article became
effective on September 1, 1971, there was some question regarding its application to
criminal acts or convictions occurring prior to that date.
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brought under section 8, paragraphs 7(a)-(d) of article XV. These para-
graphs set out the parameters of proof admissible before the commissioner
and the court. Paragraphs 7(c) and 7(d) provide:
(c) At the hearing before the Commissioner, the certificate of the
conviction of the respondent shall be conclusive evidence of his guilt
of the crime for which he has been convicted.
(d) At the hearing based upon a respondent's conviction of a crime,
the sole issue to be determined shall be whether the crime warrants
discipline, and if so, the extent thereof. At the hearing the respondent
may offer evidence only of mitigating circumstances not inconsistent
with the essential elements of the crime for which he was convicted
as determined by the statute defining the crime.
The scope of evidence which is appropriately "evidence of mitigat-
ing circumstances" becomes an essential inquiry. In Louisiana State Bar
Association v. Shaheen 4 Justice Dixon stated:
"Mitigating circumstances" are such as do not constitute a justifica-
tion or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and
mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
moral culpability. 15
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Hennigan'6 Chief Justice Sanders
referred to two types of mitigating circumstances which are admissible:
that the respondent attorney had led an exemplary life since his conviction,
and that the conviction had occasioned loss (presumptively both financial
and personal). 17 Justice Calogero, in Louisiana State Bar Association v.
Loridans, I also found proper these two types of mitigating evidence and
opined that the respondent is allowed to show that the crime did not
involve such misconduct or moral turpitude as to require disbarment.' 9
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Hamilton2 ° Justice Calogero
found admissible certain evidence reflecting "upon the character or quali-
ty of the criminal conduct or on [respondent's] degree of complicity
therein." The court would also include as acceptable mitigating evidence
proof of the respondent's age, marital status, ages of children, financial
support of other members of his family, the financial and emotional costs
14. 338 So. 2d 1347 (La. 1976).
15. Id. at 1351.
16. 340 So. 2d 264 (La. 1976).
17. Id. at 269.
18. 338 So. 2d 1338 (La. 1976).
19. Id. at 1347.
20. 343 So. 2d 985 (La. 1977).
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of the conviction, election to office in fraternal organizations after convic-
tion, that no financial profit was realized by respondent in the scheme, that
he withdrew from participation in the second fraudulent claim, and that he
was charged with involvement in only one accident and then only with
conspiracy. 2 In sum, these decisions furnish the framework for the limits
of "mitigating circumstances" and will serve as guides for future discipli-
nary proceedings based on felony convictions.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Ponder,22 disciplinary actions
were also instituted as a consequence of an attorney's conviction of two
counts of violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) by making and subscribing
income tax returns which were false as to certain material matters. The
case was first before the supreme court in 1972 for rulings on exceptions
of prematurity, no right or cause of action, a motion to dismiss and a
motion seeking admission of certain facts. The court denied both motions
and overruled the exceptions. On joint motion of all parties the proceeding
was dismissed without prejudice and the Committee held an informal
hearing as requested by the respondent. Subsequently a second petition for
disciplinary action was filed. On rehearing the court concluded that the
crime "certainly evidences moral turpitude, and, thus, respondent's
conduct warrants disciplinary action." 2 3 Noting mitigating evidence that
respondent has been a member of the bar for many years, that he was well
regarded by fellow members of the bar and bench in his home area and that
he has a good reputation among both fellow professionals and the commu-
nity-at-large, the court concluded that a suspension for six months was
appropriate disciplinary action. In doing so, the court declared, as it had
previously, that "disciplinary action is not so much for the punishment of
the attorney as it is for the preservation of the integrity of the courts and
the salutary effect it has upon other members of the bar.' '24
There were multiple exceptions filed by the respondent attorney, all
of which were overruled by the court. These included an exception of no
right or cause of action based on the fact that the crimes occurred before
the effective date of article XV. 25 That exception also asserted that no
action could be sustained under paragraph 7 of section 8 of article XV
unless and until the procedural requirements of paragraphs I through 6
21. Id. at 992.
22. 263 La. 743, 269 So. 2d 228 (1972).
23. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Ponder, 340 So. 2d 134, 148 (La. 1976).
24. Id.
25. Article XV became effective September 1, 1971 and the offenses were for
tax returns for years prior thereto.
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thereof had been followed.2 6 The court held that those latter paragraphs
provide the procedure for the entry of interim suspension orders in in-
stances where the conviction is not yet final (i.e., appeals are yet pend-
ing). In Ponder, the proceedings were filed after all appeals were
concluded and the delays had expired following denial of writs by the
United States Supreme Court. The same exception was also urged on the
basis that the Governor of Louisiana had granted a pardon. This plea was
also rejected, as it had been in the earlier decision,2 7 for it was more
appropriately addressed to a subsequent modification of the disciplinary
penalty than to the issue of the existence of a cause of action. The court
also again affirmed that a federal felony may form the basis of a discipli-
nary proceeding.
In addition, respondent again asserted prematurity, vagueness, and
liberative prescription. All pleas were denied. Of interest is the comment
by the court on the plea of prescription: "Assuming that there is some
prescriptive period applicable to disciplinary proceedings founded upon a
conviction of a crime, it would not begin to run until the conviction had
become final since, until that point, the Committee could not proceed
under paragraph seven of Section 8.",28
There is no reference to time limitation either in article XV or in the
Code of Professional Responsibility itself.29 The entire question of
whether any of the prescriptive periods, civil and/or criminal, provided in
the Louisiana codes, apply to disciplinary matters remains for another day.
In another case involving a federal conviction, the respondent pled
guilty to three counts of an indictment charging him with receiving funds
from proceeds of loans made by a federally insured savings and loan
association of which he was an off icer. 30 He had been fined $10,000.00 on
each count and sentenced to serve one year on each count. The sentences
of imprisonment were suspended and he was placed on probation, a
special condition thereof being that he not practice law for one year from
the date of the sentencing on January 31, 1976.
26. Paragraphs 1-6 of section 8 deal with the determination by the Committee
on Professional Responsibility and the supreme court for purposes of interim
suspension of whether the crime for which the attorney is convicted constitutes a
"serious crime." Paragraph 7 dictates the disciplinary procedure to be followed
once the conviction is final.
27. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Ponder, 263 La. 743, 269 So. 2d 228 (1972).
28. 340 So. 2d at 143.
29. See ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 6, art. XV.
30. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. McSween, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977).
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In a per curiam opinion the court referred to evidence reflecting that
the respondent had been a member of the bar for many years, that despite
his conviction he had maintained a good reputation among many of his
professional associates and the lay community and that after the comple-
tion of the year of suspension from practice as ordered by the sentencing
judge he continued to refrain from practicing law in a spirit of contrition.
Quoting from Ponder on the purpose of disciplinary action,3 the court
imposed a three year suspension, beginning with the date of his sen-
tencing.
ADVERTISING
Another decision, by the United States Supreme Court, merits the
very careful attention of the members of the bar, individually and collec-
tively. Reference is made to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,32 a decision
involving advertising by attorneys. The opinion compels far more careful
and detailed analysis than this writing would make possible and is destined
to be the subject of many scholarly articles. In essence, it holds that certain
limited advertising by attorneys is protected by the first amendment to the
United States Constitution. The responsibility of the organized bar to
define the limits of such advertising looms large and must be intently and
seriously addressed. This matter is considered by many as the most serious
and far-reaching challenge facing the bar in the immediate future.
The Louisiana State Bar Association has addressed itself to the Bates
decision, finding a solution which this writer feels is most compatible with
the profession's ideals and goals as well as the public's best interest. Most
of the substantive changes effected by the bar association are contained in
Disciplinary Rule 2-102(A)(7) and Ethical Consideration 2-9. Rule 2-
102(A)(7) now permits "[p]ublication of a notice in a regularly published
newspaper, magazine, periodical and the Yellow Pages of Telephone
Directories having general circulation in the parish where the attorney
advertising maintains an office advertising the availability of routine legal
services as defined herein and the fees to be charged therefor." The Rule
further provides:
The advertisement must include the following: name, including name
of law firm, one or more routine legal services, as defined herein,
which are offered and the maximum legal fee to be charged therefor;
the advertisement may include the advertiser's office address, tele-
phone number, office hours or foreign language proficiency. Any use
of the phrase "Legal Clinic" or words of similar import must be in
31. See note 24, supra, and accompanying text.
32. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
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conjunction with the name of the lawyer or law firm advertising and
no geographical or other descriptive words may be used. Advertise-
ment in the form of signs, posters, hand bills, mailings, and the like,
and the use of radio or television are expressly prohibited.
No further representations may be made concerning the max-
imum legal fees stated in said advertisement except as provided
herein. Further, no representation shall be made in any such adver-
tisement as to the quality of legal services to be performed or the
expertise of any lawyer or firm of lawyers to perform such services.
Said advertisement shall be of a [reasonable] size and all infor-
mation allowed therein shall be printed in no larger than twelve point
type.
All advertisements shall contain the following statements in type
no smaller [than] the largest size type used therein:
"The Code of Professional Responsibility of the Louisiana
State Bar requires that the above services be performed for
not more than the advertised maximum legal fee.
"The advertised maximum legal fees do not include
costs."
The term, "routine legal services" as used herein, shall be limited to
the following:
(1) Uncontested separations and divQrces
(2) Uncontested adoptions
(3) Personal bankruptcies
(4) Change of name
(5) Drafting unsecured promissory notes
(6) Drafting powers of attorney
(7) Preparation of individual income tax returns
(8) Drafting bills of sale of movables
(9) Consultation with client
Failure to perform an advertised service at the advertised max-
imum legal fee for a person responding to the advertisement shall be
misleading advertising and deceptive practice.33
Ethical Consideration 2-9 now provides:
EC 2-9 The traditional ban against advertising is rooted in the
public interest. Unlimited advertising would encourage extravagant,
33. LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 2-102. Id., E.C. 2-9.
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artful, self-laudatory efforts to secure business which could easily
mislead the public. Such would inevitably foster unrealistic expecta-
tions in particular cases and inexorably lead to distrust in the fairness
of the law and integrity of lawyers. Public confidence in our legal
system would be impaired by unrestricted advertisement of profes-
sional services. The attorney-client relationship is personal and
unique in our society and should not be established through artifices
or deceptions. Maintenance of this critically important public confi-
dence in our system of justice is best achieved by reasonable, self-
imposed controls on advertising by lawyers. Special care must be
taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the public and to assure that the
information contained in any advertising is relevant to an informed
selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be ever mindful that the
benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and accura-
cy. Illustrative examples of prohibited representations in advertising
by lawyers include: misstatements of fact, suggestions that the in-
genuity or prior experience of a lawyer, rather than the justice of the
claim, are determining factors in the result attained, inclusion of
information irrelevant to knowledgeable selection of a lawyer, and
representations as to quality, since such cannot be measured or
verified. Lawyer advertising is not spontaneous, but rather it is
calculated. Therefore, reasonable regulations designed to foster
compliance with appropriate standards serve the public interest with-
out impeding the free and clear flow of useful, meaningful, and
relevant information. Advertising by the electronic media presents
specific concerns for it is weighted more to form than substance, is
fleeting and almost impossible to adequately monitor. Accordingly,
unless and until it is demonstrated that the public interest cannot be
adequately met by advertising in the print media, advertising in the
electronic media should be and is proscribed. 34
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